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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on determining the effectiveness of a new and innovative 
concept or Tactic, Technique and Procedure (TTP) for army aviation by teaming Manned 
and Unmanned (M/UM) aircraft in the conduct of Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and 
Target Acquisition (RSTA) operations in the Contemporary Operating Environment 
(COE). M/UM aircraft teaming is described, as well as the evolution of the Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and the technology applications they bring to bear. M/UM aircraft 
teaming as a TTP is examined in two case studies: (1) The 25th Combat Aviation 
Brigade’s (CAB) use of the TTP during a 15-month deployment to MND-N during OIF 
06-08, and (2) The Battle of Sadr City, March–April 2008, in which a highly successful 
large, joint and combined arms operation was conducted. A series of experiments 
conducted at Camp Roberts, CA by the NPS-lead CENETIX team is reviewed that 
investigated using M/UM aircraft teaming and collaboration in the ad-hoc mesh 
networking environment. This thesis also describes a game theory model for M/UM 
aircraft teaming in the conduct of Counter-IED operations.  
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Imagine an insurgent fighting against the United States (U.S.) military who is a 
member of a terrorist organization, and the leader of an Improvised Explosive Device 
(IED) emplacement team. It is 2300 local time and the IED cell leader orders his small 
team to emplace an IED on a nearby Main Supply Route (MSR) that Coalition Forces 
(CF) routinely travel. He assembles his team and begins movement on foot under the 
cover of darkness to the MSR. The team’s route of movement is along a series of canals 
that leads to a choke point along the MSR. The choke point has a reed line that abuts the 
canal and MSR providing excellent concealment for the small group of insurgents while 
the IED is emplaced. Upon arrival to the IED emplacement location, the site is quickly 
surveyed to ensure no threat exists. The team readies three, 105 mm artillery rounds and 
quickly emplaces the IED, rigging it to detonate from a pressure plate, which is concealed 
under loose dirt and gravel in the middle of the road. The team then erects a night vision 
capable camcorder concealed off the route to record the detonation. After the roadside 
bomb is emplaced, the team egresses moving stealthily through the canal network, the 
team members then hear a wisp and feel a rush of air, which is their last memory.  
Lieutenant Colonel Adam Lange, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) 
Operations Officer in 2007 during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 06-08 eloquently 
summarizes this event from the friendly forces perspective: 
After midnight, near a dark and quiet village in Northern Iraq, an IED 
emplacement team digs into the side of a road frequented by Coalition 
Forces unaware they are being watched from thousands of feet above. A 
team of armed helicopters, just kilometers away readies a pair of missiles 
and awaits the report that friendly forces are clear of the target to begin 
their initial run. Located over two hundred kilometers away, the payload 
operator of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) records the hostile 
activity on his screen, activates the platform’s laser, and then designates 
the target for the manned aircraft. From the Combat Aviation Brigade 
(CAB) Tactical Operations Center (TOC), the payload operator 
communicates with both the ground force command post and the 




friendly forces have been cleared; the next transmission heard comes from 
one of the helicopters. Inbound now, target acquired… Five seconds to 
shot… Missile away...1  
This type of event frequently occurs on today’s technologically advanced battlefield. 
Army aviation, and moreover, joint aviation in general, has a vast and capable arsenal of 
systems ready to combat insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the future battlefield.  
As the above scenario suggests, this thesis examines a new concept of teaming 
Manned and Unmanned (M/UM) aircraft. More specifically, this thesis answers the 
question, “is the teaming and collaboration of M/UM aircraft, linking sensors to shooters, 
a more effective Tactic, Technique, and Procedure (TTP) in the conduct of 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) operations?”  
To determine the effectiveness of teaming M/UM aircraft in the conduct of RSTA 
operations in the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE), it is first necessary to 
understand what M/UM aircraft teaming is. The next chapter diagrams and discusses this 
innovative TTP. The following chapters provide a narrative history of the evolution of 
UAVs, and the technology applications they bring to bear.  
Subsequent chapters include two specific case studies. The first case study is from 
the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade’s 15-month deployment to OIF 06-08 in Multi-
National Division North (MND-N), from August 2006 to October 2007, in which M/UM 
aircraft teaming was utilized in its infancy. This case study shows the effects of the TTP 
over a long period of time; in the beginning, the TTP had limited effects, but over time 
and with experience, significant results were achieved. The second case study is from 3rd 
Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 4th Infantry Division during the Battle of Sadr City in 
March to April 2008. This second case study examines the teaming of M/UM aircraft 
effects over a short period of time. 
 
                                                 
1 Adam Lange, “Nightly Occurrence in the 25th CAB,” Fusion Cell Briefing, Combat Operating Base 
Spiecher, Tikrit, Iraq, August 2007.  
 3
Chapter V discusses a series of experiments conducted at Camp Roberts, CA in 
which M/UM aircraft teaming and collaboration was utilized. The objective of the 
experiments was to use the M/UM aircraft systems as combat enablers and relays, as well 
as to test the performance and distance capability of a wireless radio mesh network. 
Chapter VI examines M/UM aircraft teaming in the conduct of Counter Improvised 
Explosive Device (C-IED) operations with game theory applied. The game theory model 
discussed in Chapter VI can be used in combat operations to assist in resource allocation. 
The conclusion chapter summarizes the previous chapters. Ultimately, the conclusion 
analyzes whether the TTP of M/UM aircraft teaming in the conduct of RSTA operations 
is an effective TTP. 
 4
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II. WHAT IS M/UM AIRCRAFT TEAMING AND WHY IS IT 
IMPORTANT 
The concept of M/UM aircraft teaming has been in the development phase over 
the past two decades. The Air Maneuver Battle Laboratory (AMBL) at Fort Rucker, AL, 
and the home of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence (USAACE), initially 
conceptualized the teaming of M/UM aircraft. “Since 1993 AMBL has explored 
advanced concepts of teaming manned and unmanned aerial platform system capabilities 
on the digitized battlefield in order to capitalize on the unique benefits provided by each 
system.”2 “The focus has been on information provided by a lethal, survivable, flexible 
team—an air-maneuver team—of helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
conducting tactical reconnaissance missions.”3 
A significant amount of the information provided in this chapter comes from the 
25th Combat Aviation Brigade’s (CAB) OIF 06-08 deployment to MND-N, Iraq. The 25th 
CAB was one of the first CAB’s to utilize the M/UM aircraft teaming TTP fully in 
combat. The 25th CAB took the concept of M/UM teaming from the Comanche helicopter 
program that the AMBL at Fort Rucker, AL conceptualized and developed. Although the 
Comanche program was ended and the Comanche helicopter was never fully developed 
or fielded, the operational concepts and technological developments from the program are 
now being put into use on today’s battlefield.  
“It may be that a military figures out how to organize itself in a new way around 
an already know weapon, which makes all the old ways of fighting futile.”4 The use of 
M/UM aircraft teaming is a TTP that has evolved over the past decade, recently coming 
to fruition during OIF. Manned aircraft, such as AH-64 attack helicopters or OH-58D 
observation helicopters, teamed with a UAV, in the conduct of RSTA operations, 
                                                 
2 Anthony Jones, “UAV-Air Maneuver Integrated Operations,” Quad-a.org, February 2001, 
http://www.quad-a.org/Archives/0102.htm (accessed April 7, 2009). 
3 Ibid. 
4 P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-first Century (New 
York: The Penguin Press, 2009), 181. 
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provides the ground commander with real-time situational awareness, as well as 
surveillance, target acquisition, and lethality. Many forms of M/UM aircraft teaming 
include, but are not limited to the following. 
• A team of AH-64 attack helicopters known as an Attack Weapons Team 
(AWT) or a team of OH-58D scout helicopters known as an Scout 
Weapons Team (SWT) teamed with a UAV 
• A UAV teamed with another UAV teamed to an AWT or SWT 
• A fixed wing aircraft teamed with a UAV and/or an AWT or SWT 
Figure 1 depicts one form of M/UM aircraft teaming. The diagram illustrates an 
undetected UAV (in this case, a Hunter MQ-5B) flying thousands of feet above a group 
of insurgents teamed with two OH-58Ds scout helicopters or SWT standing off a few 
kilometers from the insurgents, remaining out-of-auditory range. The UAV operator 
located miles away in the CAB Headquarters (HQ) develops the situation and provides 
real-time voice updates for the SWT and nearby ground patrol. Depending upon the 
Positive Identification (PID) of the insurgent, and if hostile intent is verified through the 
observation of the UAV, the ground commander located in the Brigade Combat Team 
(BCT) HQ or Battalion (BN) HQ can choose to engage the insurgents kinetically with the 
use of a precision, laser-guided, hellfire missile from the SWT. If the situation does not 
warrant an engagement, the ground commander can send the ground patrol to cordon the 
area. The end result of this teaming can be kinetic or non-kinetic depending on the 
mission and the desires of the ground commander. The level of indefinable effects from 
this type of teaming should weigh heavily on an insurgent who never knows when he is 
























Figure 1.   25th CAB M/UM Aircraft Teaming Diagram5 
The diagram also depicts video and voice communications through the UAV. The 
UAV is equipped with a Communications Relay Package (CRP) that provides for 
extended range of Line of Sight (LOS) voice communications. The video from the UAV, 
also known as Full Motion Video (FMV), is transmitted to the BN/BCT HQ, and CAB 
HQ. These types of capability vastly improve commanders’ situational awareness and the 
Common Operating Picture (COP). These linkages also give the commander the ability to 
dynamically action both sensors and shooters, which is also commonly referred to as 
linking sensors to shooters. 
In a recent article, “Manned-Unmanned Aircraft Teaming Making the Quantum 
Leap,” published in the Army Aviation Magazine, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Carlile 
and William Larese state, “The advent of remotely operated unmanned systems is rapidly 
                                                 
5 M/UM Teaming Diagram, 25th CAB OIF 06-08. 
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emerging as a preferred method for supporting dangerous missions in today’s conflicts.”6 
This type of remote sensor greatly reduces the risk to the pilots of the manned aircraft. 
“The teaming maximizes coordination, integration and synchronization, and reduces the 
likelihood of risk exposure to the manned aircraft.”7 
Other forms of M/UM aircraft teaming are not illustrated above. For example, 
multiple aircraft providing overarching coverage of the battle space, extending 
communications and control over the horizon, and linking unmanned platform to 
unmanned platform. This type of teaming and linkage allows commanders to hand over 
targets between unmanned platforms until they present the optimum opportunity in the 
find, fix and finish sequence. 
Another form of M/UM aircraft teaming is a fixed wing aircraft that has day/night 
sensor/camera onboard teamed with a UAV and/or other manned aircraft, such as an 
AWT or SWT. The fixed wing aircraft also known as a Multi-Mission Airborne 
Reconnaissance & Surveillance System (MARSS) increases situational awareness 
overhead while providing additional command and control capability.  
In other mission sets, such as Direct Action, targets that consist of IED 
emplacers and Time Sensitive Targets (TSTs), such as High Value 
Individuals (HVIs) the MARSS is able to react quickly providing 
flexibility and responsiveness to the unit that it is supporting. The key is 
ensuring communications from ground and air shooters so that optimal 
situational awareness and sensor to shooter links can be maintained for 
effective coverage.8 
In this teaming scenario, the UAV can act as a voice relay and/or observe another 
Named Area of Interest (NAI) as directed by the mission commander. The AWT or SWT 
are in the battle space conducting RSTA operations and on order can provide lethal 
effects rapidly via a laser designator from the MARSS or UAV.  
                                                 
6 Christopher B. Carlile and William S. Larese, “Manned-Unmanned Aircraft Teaming Making the 
Quantum Leap,” Army Aviation, October 31, 2009. 
7 Ibid.  
8 25th CAB, OIF 06-08, text message from a briefing, Combat Operating Base Spiecher, Tikrit, Iraq, 
August 2007. 
 9
The bottom-line is that “aviation, both manned and unmanned, is an integral 
member of the joint/combined arms team in that it conducts maneuver, maneuver 
support, and maneuver sustainment operations across the spectrum of conflict.”9 The key 
benefits from M/UM aircraft teaming are: “increased operational tempos, endurance, 
lethality, agility, survivability, persistent surveillance, reduced unknown and high risk 
factors, reliable combat information, and it puts decision makers forward.”10 No matter 
what the platform, M/UM aircraft teaming improves situational awareness, network 
capabilities, voice communications, and decreases “unduly risk for the dull, dirty, and 
dangerous missions.”11  
                                                 
9 TSM-Reconnaissance/Attack Manned/Unmanned Teaming Concepts of Employment for Longbow 
Apache Block III and ERMP (Final Draft) (United States Army Aviation War Fighting Center, Fort Rucker, 
AL). 
10 Carlile and Larese, “Manned-Unmanned Aircraft Teaming Making the Quantum Leap.”  
11 TSM-Reconnaissance/Attack Manned/Unmanned Teaming Concepts of Employment for Longbow 
Apache Block III and ERMP (Final Draft). 
 10
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III. THE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV) AND ITS 
EVOLUTION 
The pattern with unmanned planes in the early twenty-first century seems 
to be mirroring what happened with manned planes in the early, twentieth 
century.12 
 
On September 11, 2001, a terrorist organization struck the heart of the U.S. by 
flying hijacked airplanes into the twin towers killing thousands of innocent people. The 
tragic attack on 9/11 pushed the U.S. to enter war, the Global War on Terror (GWOT). 
As history suggests with war comes military technological advances with some 
technologies leading what is known as a Revolution in Military Affairs. Since the 
beginning of the GWOT, military innovations and technology improvements have been 
forthcoming, particularly in the area of UAVs and UASs. The UAV, and its enabling 
technologies, is one of many military innovations that have come to fruition since the 
onset of the GWOT.  
A. THE UAV HISTORY 
TA wide variety of definitions exist for UAVs; however, for the purposes of this 
research, a UAV is “an aircraft with no onboard pilot that can be remote controlled or fly 
autonomously based on pre-programmed flight plans or more complex dynamic 
automation systems.”13 The UAV’s history begins in February 1863, two years after the 
start of the Civil War, an inventor from New York City named Charles Perley, registered 
a patent for an unmanned aerial bomber. Mr. Perley designed a hot-air balloon that could 




                                                 
12 Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-first Century, 119. 
13 Thefreedictonary.com, Unmanned Air Vehicle, 
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Unmanned+Air+Vehicle (accessed November 15, 2008). 
 12
trip the balloon's hinged basket, and the explosives would drop out, igniting a fuse in the 
process. Both Union and Confederate forces are said to have launched Perley's balloons 
during the war, with limited success.14 
Two decades after Perley’s invention of the balloon aerial bomber, Douglas 
Archibald took the first successful aerial photographs from a large kite in 1883.15 “The 
key to the timing that turns a discovery or invention into successful innovation lies in 
whether the laymen can envision its possibilities.”16 The kite experimenter’s photographs 
were published and an American soldier, Corporal William Eddy, recognized the 
potential for a wartime application using Archibald's design.17  
During the Spanish-American War of 1898, Corporal Eddy took hundreds 
of surveillance photographs from a kite rigged with a long shutter release 
attached to its string. Many of Eddy's aerial photographs—the first 
wartime surveillance photos in history—provided critical information to 
American troops about their adversaries' positions and fortifications.18  
Corporal Eddy unknowingly set the stage for UAVs during the next century. In 
1917, Dr. Peter Cooper and Elmer A. Sperry, converted a U.S. Navy Curtiss N-9 trainer 
aircraft into the first radio-controlled UAV named the Sperry Aerial Torpedo. In 1935, 
the Queen Bee radio controlled UAV was developed, marking the first returnable and 
reusable UAV. The Queen Bee was a spruce and plywood biplane that anti-aircraft 
gunners in the Royal Air Force and Navy used for aerial target practice.19  
 
 
                                                 
14 PBS.org, “Spies that Fly: Time Line of UAVs,” Nova Science Programming on Air and Online. 
November 2002, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/spiesfly/uavs.html (accessed October 20, 2008).  
15 Ibid. 
16 Alan Beyerchen, “From Radio to Radar: Interwar Military Adaptation to Technological Change in 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. 
Williamson Murray, and Allan R Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 265. 
17 Ibid. 
18 PBS.org, “Spies that Fly: Time Line of UAVs.”  
19 Ibid. 
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UAV innovations continued into World War II with Nazi Germany’s production 
of the V-1. Nazi Germany terrorized much of England with the V-1. After World War II, 
UAV development continued; however, many of the developments were in the form of 
target drones. UAVs as known today started to evolve during the Cold War era.  
Figure 2 shows Master Sergeant (retired) Charles Casey (on the left) utilizing a 
starting cart of sorts to begin an OQ-19 drone during 1960 in Germany. The OQ-19, also 
known as the SD-1, was one of the first drones in the U.S. Army to incorporate a still 
camera with optional TV sensor. The SD-1 was launched by a rocket booster and was 
recovered by parachute.20 
 
 
Figure 2.   Picture of an OQ-19/SD-1’s Starting Process21 
 
                                                 
20 Charles Casey, U.S. Army Drone in 1960, interview by the author, September 1, 2009. 
21 Ibid. 
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In 1960, the U.S. Air Force began the development of combat UAVs for 
reconnaissance missions, the AQM-34 Ryan Firebee. “Impressed by America's AQM-34 
Ryan Firebee UAV, Israel secretly purchased 12 Firebees from the U.S. in 1970, 
modified them, and designated them as the Firebee 1241 UAVs.”22  
During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Firebee 1241s were used for 
reconnaissance missions and as decoys against Syria and Egypt. “On the 
second day of the war the Israeli Air Force deployed their fleet of armed 
Firebees to lead attacks against Egyptian air defenses along the Suez. The 
Egyptians fired their entire inventory of surface-to-air missiles at the 
Firebees—43 missiles in all. The Firebees successfully evaded 32 of the 
missiles and destroyed 11 with their Shrike anti-radar missiles.23 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Israel aggressively developed many new UAVs, 
such as the Scott and Pioneer. The Scott was the first UAV capable of transmitting real-
time imagery. In 1982, during the Bekaa Valley conflict, Israel used Scott UAVs to 
search out Syrian missile sites and entice the Syrians to activate their radars allowing 
bomber aircraft to destroy 17 missile sites, and continue an unhindered air campaign.24 
Leading into the 1990s, the Pioneer UAV was used by both the U.S. and Israel. 
The Pioneer saw action during the Gulf War and later in the Balkans. A fitting name, the 
Pioneer, led to the development of the next generation of UAVs, the UAVs of the 
GWOT. 
B. UAVS OF TODAY 
UAVs of today owe their capabilities and technological advancements to the past 
century of conflict as summarized above. “During the 1990s, the Department of Defense 
(DoD) invested over $3 billion in UAV development, procurement, and operations; while 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) were the main uses; UAVs  
 
                                                 




were also being developed as weapons platforms.”25 The U.S. military’s arsenal of UAVs 
has grown considerably since the beginning of the GWOT. Today’s UAVs vary in 
capability, size and by branch of military service.  
The RQ-1 Predator is a U.S. Air Force UAV developed from the aforementioned 
prolonged slither of technological development. The Predator has a 450-mile range, 16 
hours of endurance, and can provide high definition, real time surveillance. The Predator 
is also equipped with infrared cameras and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). “A ground 
team from a remote control station controls the plane either by a line-of-sight radio 
connection or via a satellite link.”26 The Predator is also weaponized capable based on 
mission requirements and can carry laser guided Hellfire missiles that can be shot 
autonomously or used remotely. Used by the CIA in Afghanistan after 9/11, the Predator 
was credited with the first Hellfire autonomous engagement from a UAV in October 
2001. “The Predator UAV has been operational in Bosnia since 1995 in support of 
NATO, UN and U.S. operations and as part of OEF in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF), flying over 500,000 flight hours on over 50,000 flights.”27  
Another GWOT UAV development is the U.S. Army’s RQ-11 Raven. The Raven 
weighs less than 20 pounds, is launched by hand, can be carried in a backpack, and can 
fly low altitudes. The Raven has limited station time and range but is equipped with a 
small camera that provides real time imagery. The Raven is generally used at the 
company or platoon level for force protection and reconnaissance missions. “Ravens 
form part of the U.S. Army's 361-strong UAV contingent deployed in Iraq, which also 
includes Hunters and Shadows; between January and October 2007, they notched up over 
300,000 hours aloft.”28  
                                                 
25 J. W. Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Nebraska: 
iUniverse, 2005), 323. 
26 PBS.org, “Spies that Fly: Time Line of UAVs.”  
27 “Predator RQ-1—Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), USA,” Airforcetechnology.com, n.d. 
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/predator/ (accessed October 20, 2008). 
28 Paul Fiddian, “U.S. Military’s UAV Mission Increasing,” Armedforcesinternational.com. February 
1, 2008, http://www.armedforces-int.com/news/2008/01/02/us-mili... (accessed November 15, 2008). 
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The RQ-7 Shadow, tactical UAV, is larger than the Raven and is launched from a 
catapult type system. The Shadow has approximately 100 kilometers of range, 12 hours 
of station time and flies at altitudes less than 10,000 feet. The Shadow is equipped with a 
day/night camera that provides real time imagery to the supported unit, generally at the 
battalion level.  
The MQ-5B Hunter UAV is another UAV that came to fruition during the 
GWOT.  The Hunter was originally developed in the late 1990s, but not until the GWOT, 
was its effectiveness seen. The Hunter is a short range UAV capable of flying at ranges 
more than 200 kilometers from its Ground Control Station (GCS). The Hunter is 
equipped with a day/night camera and generally flies at altitudes of 10,000 feet or below. 
The Hunter is the first U.S. Army weaponized UAV. The Hunter can carry one “Viper 
Strike” munition that weighs approximately 40 pounds. The Viper Strike is a gravity 
dropped laser guided munition with less than 10 pounds of explosives. Generally, the 
Hunter supports brigade level operations. “Part of the adaptation to a new technology 
involves learning how to gauge its effectiveness.”29 On September 1, 2007 in northern 
Iraq, the Hunter UAV dropped a Viper Strike on two unsuspecting insurgents over-
watching a roadside bomb. This historic moment marked the first ever U.S. Army UAV 
autonomous engagement. The Hunter UAV, and numerous other UAVs flying over the 
skies of Iraq and Afghanistan, have contributed to the safety of thousands of soldiers, 
sailors, Marines and airmen.  
C. THE UAV AND ITS FUTURE 
“One of the most difficult issues involved in questions of technological adaptation 
is not whether but rather when the innovations will have the anticipated effect.”30 Just 
over 100 years ago, the first UAV was a balloon rigged with explosives, and today, 
UAVs are capable of flying hundreds of miles, collecting intelligence from thousands of 
                                                 
29 Beyerchen, “From Radio to Radar: Interwar Military Adaptation to Technological Change in 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, 297. 
30 Geoffrey Till, “Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, American and Japanese Case Studies,” in 
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 193. 
 17
feet above, and autonomously engaging targets. In February 2008, Dyke Weatherington, 
who oversees the unmanned systems wing of the U.S. DoD said, “the Pentagon’s 
inventory of unmanned aerial systems has leaped from 200 in 2002 to nearly 6,000 in 
2008 and the Defense Department has a $15 billion budget just for unmanned systems.”31  
Recently, a U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter battalion was fielded with 
a new Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) DATA LINK. The data link 
allows the pilots of the AH-64 helicopters to view streaming, real time video from UAVs 
or Air Force fighter jets’ targeting pods.32 Video from Unmanned Aircraft Systems for 
Interoperability Teaming-Level 2 (VUIT-2) kits also provide Apache crews with 
improved target acquisition, ISR collection capability, and improved situational 
awareness. The video can, in turn, be down-linked to the ground for simultaneous display 
to soldiers equipped with ground terminals.33 The VUIT-2 kit improves the teaming of 
M/UM aircraft to address real time situations on today’s battlefield. The VUIT-2 kit is 
just one more step in the development of the next generation of UAVs and M/UM aircraft 
teaming collaborative engagements. 
Task Force ODIN is a futuristic U.S. Army Aviation task force designed, fielded 
and manned to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Originally deployed to Iraq 
in support of OIF in the summer of 2006, the task force combines both manned and 
unmanned aircraft to provide real-time reconnaissance and intelligence gathering to the 
supported unit. Task Force ODIN’s aircraft inventory consists of C12 airplanes also 
known as MARSS, and the MQ-12 Warrior Alpha UAV. Both airframe types are 
equipped with multiple sensors for day/night reconnaissance and surveillance. The 
Warrior Alpha can also be modified and armed with hellfire missiles. The imagery from 
the manned or unmanned aircraft from Task Force ODIN is broadcast to field units via an 
                                                 
31 Anne Broache, “Army Official: UAVs are 'Unsung Heroes' in Iraq,” CNET.com, February 29, 2008, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9883300-7.html (accessed November 15, 2009). 
32 M. Malenic, “Apache Unit Equipped with New ISR Data Links to Deploy in Coming Weeks,” 
Defensedaily.com. October 9, 2008, http://www.defensedaily.com/publications/c4i/4262.html (accessed 
November 15, 2008).  
33 Ibid. 
 18
OSRVT or One System Remote Video Transceiver.34 Task Force ODIN’s successes in 
support of OIF have lead to the DoD’s fielding of another such task force that recently 
deployed to Afghanistan.  
The U.S. Army is in the process of developing and fielding the MQ-1C Sky 
Warrior. The Sky Warrior is a variant of the Predator with increased capabilities. “The 
U.S. Army has stated a requirement for 11 Sky Warrior systems (each with 12 air 
vehicles and five ground stations), planning to deploy them with one company assigned 
to each of 10 divisions and one to a training unit.”35 The Sky Warrior will be a division 
level asset supporting BCTs and joint operations in the conduct of RSTA and ISR 
operations. 
The UAVs of today and their enabling technologies should be considered one of 
the top military innovations of the GWOT. The evolution of technology and the UAV 
over the last century has been nothing short of science fiction meeting reality on the 
battlefield. Consider the advancements from Perley’s Balloon Aerial Bomber, to the SD-
1, Firebee, Pioneer, Hunter, and today’s Predator. The evolution of the UAV has had a 
tremendous impact on the battlefield, and its potential in the future is unbounded and 
limited only to the imagination. 
                                                 
34 CASR.ca, “Canadian American Strategic Review 2008. Background Comparison, U.S. Army 
Aviation, Task Force Odin,” http://www.casr.ca/bg-army-aviation-tf-odin.htm (accessed November 15, 
2008). 
35 Jane’s Defense Equipment and Technology, “Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, MQ-1C Sky 
Warrior,” http://www.janes.com (accessed October 6, 2009). 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
Teaming UAS with manned aircraft systems provides enhanced 
operational fires and maneuver efforts while extending the command and 
control and intelligence capabilities for the commander. Teaming provides 
force protection, reconnaissance, and surgical lethality to the maneuver 
force. It can operate at extended depth and has the flexibility to rapidly 
adjust to changing conditions. Manned aircraft make required decisions 
and reduce sensor-to-shooter time in dealing with fleeting targets, 
especially in constrained Rules Of Engagement (ROE) environments.36  
 
A. BATTLE OF SADR CITY, CASE STUDY 
What follows are notes of the major elements of General Petraeus’ remarks 
referencing the Battle of Sadr City, Iraq in March-April 2008, which he briefed to the 
U.S. Military & Foreign Policy World Affairs Council in Seattle, WA on July 8, 2009. C-
SPAN later aired this briefing.37 
After Prime Minister Maliki directed the operation in Basrah against the 
Jaysh al Mahdi in March 2008, the militia also erupted in the Sadr City 
district of Baghdad, pounding the International Zone with as many as 20 
volleys of multiple rockets each day.  
Over the course of about a week, we managed to assemble the platforms 
depicted here and emplace the various supporting architectures and pipes 
to pull it all together. In this case, assets, and the responsibility to employ 
them, were pushed to a single brigade commander, Colonel (COL) John 
Hort of 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. COL Hort had a variety of assets 
at his disposal: mechanized infantry in Bradleys, Stryker infantry and 
cavalry, M1 tanks, Special Operations Forces (SOF) snipers, Iraqi 
Conventional Forces, Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Counter-fire 
radars, precision artillery, Guided Missile Launch Rocket Systems (which 
allowed us to hit a meeting of Special Groups leaders right across the 
street from a hospital without even breaking a window in the hospital). 
                                                 
36 FM 3-04.155 (Draft), Army Unmanned Aircraft System Operations. 
37 David Petraues, C-SPAN video briefed at the U.S. Military & Foreign Policy World Affairs 
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Figure 3.   The Battle Sadr City March-April 2008, 3BCT/4th ID38 
“This ISR slide depicts the evolution of how we fight; it graphically depicts the 
Battle of Sadr City, and how far combat has evolved from the slugfest that was the Battle 
of Fallujah.”39 
On top of all this, we arrayed all the ISR assets depicted here. Supporting 
this one brigade, 24/7, were 2 Predators (armed with Hellfire missiles), 
Shadow and Raven UAVs, aerostat blimps with optics, Raid towers, 3 air 
weapons teams (of 2 AH64 Apaches each), and 2 additional UAVs with 
special capabilities. Also in support was Close Air Support (CAS), and the 
national, strategic intelligence platforms depicted at the top of the slide. 
We gave the brigade more ISR than any unit in history.  
The BCT Commander’s (CDR) Command Post (CP) had feeds for each 
ISR (screen displays for each platform with chat rooms underneath), and 
we gave him the authority to pull the trigger—authorities that in some 
                                                 
38 Petraues, C-SPAN video briefed at the U.S. Military & Foreign Policy World Affairs Council. 
39 Ibid. 
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cases had been held as high as Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I)… This 
required an enormous amount of real-time coordination; for example, 
those seeing a feed in the CP conversed on chat rooms with the payload 
operators flying the assets at Nellis AFB, while at the same time analysts 
at Ft. Meade, Ft. Gordon, Germany, and the United Kingdom were also 
providing feedback. Those on the ground could tell the operator of the 
optic on an Aerostat where to focus. This type of C2 has enormous 
implications for signals intelligence and overlaying HUMINT; we found 
new applications every month.  
This brigade leveraged all these assets to kill 77 mortar and rocket teams. 
The brigade killed 780 militia members. A typical action might be: a 
militant launches a rocket; it is picked up by counter-fire radar; a UAV 
gets “eyes on” the point of origin and tracks the militant through the city 
to a car trunk that serves as a weapons cache; the weapons cache is hit 
with a hellfire. We would also park a UAV over known locations, because 
they would reuse locations and withdraw quickly; we also had Apaches 
circling the city looking at NAIs. We started responsive fusion of systems 
to start being predictive, focused on known or expected rocket launch 
sites. We targeted the 8 Special Groups leaders, killing one, wounding 
another, and killing the 3 special assistants of another (who made the 
mistake of borrowing their leader’s car); after which, the remaining 
Special Groups leaders fled to Iran.  
In the southern quarter of Sadr City, our troopers had to fight and wrest 
away that portion of the city and every night work to extend the T-Wall a 
couple hundred meters. We still used conventional operations, including 
rifle and tank fire, but the enablers gave us an enormous edge.  
The key is not to overload a CDR with too many assets—pushing 
resources and the authorities to employ them to the proper level. This is a 
skill our leaders have learned through experience, and all the ISR 
hardware in the world is useless without skilled operators and 
commanders on the ground who know how to leverage it. Good C2 of 
these systems is important, as decision time is often the limiting factor in 
their use. This is about developing human capital over the course of years. 
C2 of these ISR assets is tough to replicate in training scenarios or in 
Combat Training Centers (CTC); it is outstripping our ability to model it. 
As remarkable as the aggregation of capabilities on this battlefield is the 
evolution of the sensory piece of the battlefield and of the ability of 
commanders to leverage it all. 
The Battle of Sadr City, March–April 2008, was a remarkable illustration of how 
effective the teaming of M/UM aircraft can be in the conduct of RSTA operations. The 
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end result of 780 militia members killed, and a safe and secure Sadr City, was a 
remarkable accomplishment; understanding of course, that the C2 of the entire, complex 
operation was probably the second biggest achievement of 3BCT/4th ID.  
B. 25th COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
06-08, CASE STUDY 
Cooperative operations enable the aviation or ground commander to 
develop the situation, and conduct decisive, integrated air-ground 
operations to close with and destroy the enemy through fire and maneuver. 
Cooperative engagements extend the tactical reach of maneuver forces 
while furnishing the commander with immediate reinforcing fires. During 
close combat operations, cooperative engagements enable precision direct 
and indirect fires integrated into the ground scheme of maneuver.40 
In a 25th CAB published article, Colonel A. T. Ball discusses the operational 
impact of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). The 25th UAS Company focused on M/UM 
teaming during OIF 06-08, creating dynamic linkages between “sensors” and “shooters,” 
and presented opportunities where UAS “sensors” developed the enemy situation and 
allowed the “shooters” to standoff at safe distances.41 COL Ball later describes that after 
“sensors” established hostile intent and positive identification, “shooters” were then able 
to engage the enemy either through autonomous means or through remote laser 
designation. The 25th UAS broadened the use of unmanned assets from the traditional 
ISR process to a more operational RSTA focus in the maneuver fight.42  
Capabilities of Army UAS have evolved from a theater intelligence asset 
to primarily tactical roles, such as surveillance, reconnaissance, attack, 
targeting, communications relay, convoy overwatch, and cooperative 
target engagement through M/UM aicraft teaming. The Army is 




                                                 
40 FM 3-04.155 (Draft), Army Unmanned Aircraft System Operations. 
41 A. T. Ball, “25th Unmanned Aerial Systems Company Always Watching over the Iraqi Skies,” 
Newsblaze.com, October 2007, http://newsblaze.com/story/20071004115810tsop.nb/topstory.html 
(accessed January 25, 2009).  
42 Ibid. 
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fix, follow, facilitate, and finish targets. Army UAS missions are 
integrated into the maneuver commander’s mission planning, at the start, 
as a combat multiplier in the contemporary operational environment.43 
During the 25th CAB’s 15-month deployment to MND-N Iraq, it supported five 
BCTs with RSTA assets to include AH-64s, OH-58Ds, UASs, and other platforms from 
TF ODIN. Over the course of the deployment, the M/UM aircraft teaming TTP was 
utilized in the conduct of RSTA operations resulting in 157 “sensor to shooter” 
engagements with a Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) of 532 insurgents either Killed In 
Action (KIA), Wounded In Action (WIA), or detained. Additionally, the CAB had 697 
“shooter” engagements with 1,757 insurgents either KIA, WIA, or detained. 
Major John Herrman, the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Fires and Effects 
Coordination Cell (FECC) for the 25th CAB during the OIF 06-08 deployment, conducted 
a statistical analysis of the CAB’s shooter and sensor to shooter engagement data set. The 
purpose of the analysis was to, “provide an information brief through statistical analysis 
depicting the process, measure, efficiency and packaging of Manned & unmanned aerial 
platforms of the 25th CAB during OIF 06-08, and how this integration has developed a 
more effective method to find and efficient process to engage the enemy.”44 
Major Herrman began his analysis by defining the terms listed below. 
• Sensor: An un/manned system that has the ability to detect targets and 
relay this information to other systems to improve situational awareness 
• Shooter: An aircraft, which can engage the enemy with munitions, such 
as Attack Aviation, CAS, or Hunter-Viper Strike 
• Sensor–Shooter: The pairing of a sensor platform with a shooter to 
facilitate engagement of the enemy 
• Enabler: Other systems, which can interface with sensors and/or shooters, 
and by doing so, improve the overall performance 
• Engagement: Taking action on the enemy—regardless of enemy size or 
number of attacks by the aircraft 
                                                 
43 Jeffery Kappenman, “Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Decisive in Battle,” 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i49/10.pdf (accessed October 16, 2009). 
44 John Herrman, Documenting TTPs Statistical Analysis, PowerPoint presentation for the 25th 
Combat Aviation Brigade from Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08, Tikrit, Iraq, October 2007.  
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• BDA: The total number of enemy KIA/WIA/Detained in an engagement 
• Employment Type: The process in which the target is engaged (Shooter, 
Sensor-Shooter) 
• Employment Efficiency: The ratio of number of engagements with at 
least one enemy KIA/WIA/Detained divided by the total number of 
engagements 
• RSTA: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition. Used by 
the 25th CAB when referring to the employment of UAVs 
Major Herrman explained that, “repeated observations of shooter and sensor-
shooter engagements appeared to show sensor-shooter engagements growing in 
efficiency.”45 The observations he studied for statistical significance were in two 
categories, employment type, and employment efficiency. He compared the sensor to 
shooter number of engagements and BDA over time to the shooter number of 
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Figure 4.   25th CAB Sensor to Shooter & Shooter Engagements and BDA over 
Time46 
                                                 
45 Herrman, Documenting TTPs Statistical Analysis, PowerPoint presentation for the 25th Combat 
Aviation Brigade from Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08. 
46 Ibid. 
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Figure 4 shows that BDA and engagement percentage trend steadily increased, 
which is significant given the ratio of sensors to shooters operating on the battlefield at a 
given period. Major Herrman stated, “it’s important to note that while the percentage of 
sensor to shooter engagements increased overtime, there was no reduction in the amount 
of per shooter engagements, in other words the 25th CAB didn’t swap one method for 
another.”47 
Refining his analysis, John Herrman continued with an efficiency analysis 
measurement. He measured opportunities made and missed defined below as each 
separate instance the enemy was positively identified.  
• An opportunity made was an engagement where at least one enemy was 
KIA/WIA/Detained—enemy removed from the battlefield 
• An opportunity missed was an engagement in which no enemy was 
KIA/WIA/Detained—the enemy lives to fight another day 
Major Herrman then calculated the efficiency ratio Opportunities 
Made/Opportunities. See Figures 5 and 6 for a graphical depiction of the results.48  
. 
                                                 
47 Herrman, Documenting TTPs Statistical Analysis, PowerPoint presentation for the 25th Combat 
Aviation Brigade from Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08. 





– 697 opportunities. 
– 1757 enemy combatants KIA, WIA or detained.
• Measure
– Of 697 opportunities, 560 yielded opportunities made (137 
missed opportunities).
– Efficiency rating of 80%.
Opportunity Efficiency 






Figure 5.   25th CAB, OIF 06-08 Shooter Efficiency49 
Figure 5 shows there were 697 shooter engagement opportunities, of which 560 were 
made or successful and 137 opportunities were missed. The resultant was an efficiency 
ratio of 80 percent and BDA of 1,757 enemy combatants removed from the battlefield. 
                                                 
49 Herrman, Documenting TTPs Statistical Analysis, PowerPoint presentation for the 25th Combat 





– 532 enemy combatants KIA, WIA or detained
• Measure
– Of 157 opportunities, 130 yielded opportunities made. That 
leaves 27 missed opportunities. 
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Figure 6.   25th CAB, OIF 06-08 Sensor to Shooter Efficiency50 
Figure 6 shows there were 157 sensor to shooter engagement opportunities, of which 130 
opportunities were made or successful and 27 were missed. The resultant was an 
efficiency ratio of 83 percent and BDA of 532 enemy combatants removed from the 
battlefield. 
The teaming of manned platforms with UAS is fast becoming the standard 
in the Army rather than the exception. M/UM teaming extends the 
shooter’s eyes on target by linking UAS sensors to the manned platforms. 
UAS with laser-designator payloads have the ability to laser designate for 
attack platforms as part of a cooperative engagement, providing maximum 
standoff distance for the manned aircraft and increasing survivability. 
UAS are also used to cross cue time-sensitive targets and/or provide 
overwatch while commanders determine the optimal manner in which to 
prosecute a specific target.51 
                                                 
50 Herrman, Documenting TTPs Statistical Analysis, PowerPoint presentation for the 25th Combat 
Aviation Brigade from Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08. 
51 Kappenman, “Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Decisive in Battle.” 
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In summary, the 25th CAB’s sensor to shooter linkage made each opportunity 
more lethal by over three percent. If resources were abundant, and the 25th CAB utilized 
the teaming of M/UM in every engagement opportunity, hypothetically and statistically, 
53 additional enemy combatants would have been removed from the battlefield. 
Understanding that for the 25th CAB, the use of M/UM aircraft teaming was a TTP that 
grew in its effectiveness over time, the three percent mentioned above could be much 
greater with continued implementation.   
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V. MANNED AND UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS AND 
NETWORK-CENTRIC COLLABORATION: A LOOK AT 
TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS FOR AERIAL SYSTEMS AS 
THEY RELATE TO TODAY’S WARFARE OPERATIONS 
Over the course of 2009, a team at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) working 
through the Center for Network Innovation and Experimentation (CENETIX), conducted 
a series of experiments to develop and analyze the use of Manned and Unmanned 
(M/UM) aircraft teaming and network centric collaboration as enablers in support of 
today’s warfighters. The experiment culminated on November 15, 2009 with significant 
success.  
CENETIX is a unique organization in that it utilizes academic researchers 
coupled with contractors and other agencies to explore frontiers of self-organizing 
tactical networking and collaboration. “It provides students and faculty with opportunities 
for interdisciplinary study of agile adaptive wireless networks, network-controlled 
unmanned vehicles, sensors, intelligent agents, and situational awareness platforms.”52 
Primarily, CENETIX conducts “several national level field experimentation campaigns, 
including the Tactical Network Topology (TNT) program, run in cooperation with U.S. 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)” at Camp Roberts, CA.53 
The TNT experimentation process with USSOCOM is focused on both 
technologies associated with networking and the human aspects of 
networked forms of organization. Technologies investigated have included 
network controlled Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), various forms of 
multiplatform wireless networking, mesh networked tactical vehicles, 
deployable operations centers, collaborative technologies, situational 






                                                 
52 Center for Network Innovation and Experimentation, Naval Postgraduate School, 
http://cenetix.nps.edu/cenetix/ (accessed November 16, 2009). 
53 Ibid. 
 30
unmanned vehicle-decision maker self-organizing environments… The 
focus has been on both adapting both emerging and commercially 
available technologies to military requirements…54 
Within the broad spectrum of NPS/USSOCOM experiments, the NPS-led M/UM 
aircraft teaming series of experiments conducted at Camp Roberts, CA included students 
and professors from NPS and contractors, such as AvWatch, WinTec, Persistent Systems, 
and the Software Engineering Institute from Urban Robotics. The experiments’ objective 
was to explore network-defined constraints associated with M/UM aircraft system 
collaboration in the environment of mesh broadband wireless networking between the 
aircraft systems and ground maneuver units. Subject to network constraints, 
correspondingly, the tactical scenario for the experiment was designed to support the 
concept of Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize (ODIN) Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IED) that plague U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. The primary task of the 
experiments was to analyze the wireless broadband networks performance and distance 
capability via a manned aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) through wave 
relay radios (see Figure 7) during a simulated counter-IED scenario. Additionally, the 
experiment sought to hand-off the day/infrared camera sensor from the manned aircraft 
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Collaboration,” Center for Network Innovation and Experimentation (CENETIX), Naval Postgraduate 
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Figure 7.   Wave Relay Radio, product of Persistent Systems, is an “off the shelf, 
mobile ad hoc networking system available in a man portable form, 
providing a wearable wireless connectivity solution for users on the 
move.”55 
Colonel A. T. Ball, Chief of Staff, United States Army Pacific, comments on the 
experiments.  
Developing a way for the system to hand off control of the manned 
aircrafts' sensor to the ground unit is consistent with the goals of 
furthering our air to ground integration as part of the C-IED fight. This 
experiment is of significant operational importance and draws upon the 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) and enhanced air to ground 
integration that came to fruition during Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08. 
These sort of TTPs played a large role in Task Force ODIN's success and 
further advances in this domain will add great value to our warfighters in 
the C-IED fight.56 
Figure 8 diagrams a manned aircraft with a wave relay radio installed coupled 
with a day/infrared camera sensor receiving broadband wireless data from a directional 
antenna stationed and fixed at the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). In turn, the manned 
aircraft, operated by AvWatch, and orbiting thousands of feet overhead, was transmitting 
network data to the ground unit via a look down antenna. For experimentation purposes, 
the ground unit was a black Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) manned by two personnel. The 
                                                 
55 Persistent Systems, http://www.persistentsystems.com/ (accessed November 16, 2009). 
56 Arthur T. Ball, e-mail message to the author, November 10, 2009. 
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SUV was also configured with a wave relay radio that received the manned aircraft’s 
signal and displayed the received data on a laptop. The laptop in the SUV was configured 
with software and a video game like controller provided by AvWatch that enabled the 
passenger in the SUV to monitor the manned aircrafts sensor video, as well as the 
capability to control the manned aircraft’s camera sensor. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Pictorial of the Experiment. 
Figure 9 depicts a manned aircraft receiving and transmitting broadband wireless 
data to and from the TOC. The manned aircraft is also broadcasting data to the ground 
unit or Quick Reaction Force (QRF). The data streaming over the network includes Full 












Figure 9.   Phase One of the TNT M/UM Aircraft Teaming Experiment 
Phase one of the experiment utilized the manned aircraft as a relay for the ground 
vehicle/QRF depicted as the Command and Control (C2) vehicle. The C2 vehicle, while 
on the move, was able to observe the manned aircrafts FMV. Distances of up to 15 miles 
were obtained; however, further distances can be achieved with a vehicle-mounted 
directional antenna. Phase one of the experiment also tested the distance of the network 
signal from the TOC to the manned aircraft. The manned aircraft was flying at 8500’ 
Above Ground Level (AGL) with a directional antenna resulting in 27 miles of 




Figure 10.   Phase One Experimentation Depiction Results. 
Phase two, as depicted below, utilized the manned aircraft as a relay from the 
TOC to a Raven UAV to the QRF. The manned aircraft orbited at 5000’, while a Raven 
Airborne Wireless Access Point (A-WAP) UAV orbited at 400’ AGL above the QRF. 
The QRF vehicle moved to an area of low terrain with high terrain surrounding the 
vehicle. The QRF then measured the signal strength of the network and determined that 
the Raven UAV as a relay improved the signal strength by approximately 40 percent. The 

















Figure 11.   Phase Two of the TNT M/UM Aircraft Teaming Experiment 
Overall, this phase of the experiment was a major success. Some of the significant 
lessons learned during the experiment were the following. 
• Antenna selection makes a significant difference; if available, use 
directional antennas 
• The Raven UAV as a relay would be better suited with both a top and 
bottom antenna 
• All users should be on the same sub-net setting 
• Add amplifiers for more through put and better performance 
• VOIP on the wave relay is essential and would significantly benefit the 
user 
• Channel width—use a smaller channel width for greater distances and a 
more reliable data link 
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“Collaborative technologies are leading the revolution in military affairs as they 
help commanders and warfighters realize long-sought capabilities in the network-centric 
force.”57 
In summary, by teaming M/UM aircraft in a network centric and collaboration 
environment, the ground commanders situational greatly improves. The experiments 
allowed the identification of network associated constraints for configuring the ad hoc 
mesh network by changing the roles between M/UM aircraft as relay and surveillance 
nodes. As demonstrated in these experiments, this type of ad hoc, mesh networking, with 
wave relay radios via M/UM aircraft, is an efficient solution helping to overcome steep 
terrain and provides an over-the-horizon capability to the warfighter on the ground, 
which could be a solution to the problems U.S. soldiers are facing in Afghanistan. 
Continued research and experimentation in this domain benefits the warfighters, civil 
services, and homeland security in the United States. 
                                                 
57 Robert K. Ackerman, “Collaboration Enables Technological Slight of Hand,” Signal Magazine 
(May 2006): 45–50. 
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VI. GAME THEORY—MANNED AND UNMANNED (M/UM) 
AIRCRAFT TEAMING C-IED OPERATIONS VERSUS THE IED 
PROBLEM SOMEWHERE IN IRAQ OR AFGHANISTAN 
A.  THE DILEMMA 
The IED problem that exists in Iraq and Afghanistan continues to plague friendly 
forces. In a recent report, Secretary of Defense Gates “pledged more equipment and 
surveillance to protect troops against the roadside bombs… ‘We are in the process of 
putting significant additional surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in 
Afghanistan’.” Gates also said, “Additional material worked well for us in Iraq in dealing 
with the IED problem. We're hoping it's going to work in Afghanistan as well.”58 The 
report also stated, “at least 306 coalition troops have lost their lives since the beginning of 
the year, up from 294 in 2008. Many of the casualties have been the result of roadside 
bombs.”59 
The game question to be analyzed and modeled is, given a particular section of a 
Main Supply Route (MSR) where IED activity has been high, either in Iraq or 
Afghanistan, where should friendly forces focus reconnaissance efforts? Additionally, on 
what Targeted Area of Interest (TAI) should the insurgents focus their efforts? 
B.  THE GAME 
This game takes place somewhere in Iraq or Afghanistan and occurs on a daily 
basis (24 hours a day) along a MSR frequently traveled by Blue Forces (friendly forces). 
Red Forces (insurgents) continually disrupt the movement of troops and supplies, and 
sometimes injure Blue Forces by emplacing and detonating IEDs along the MSR.  
Blue Forces have multiple reconnaissance resources both manned (scout and 
attack helicopters) and unmanned (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles—UAVs) aircraft to 
                                                 
58 Shaun Tandon, “Gates Vows Aid against Afghan Roadside Bombs,” Jieddo.dod.mil, August 31, 
2009, https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/article.aspx?ID=611 (accessed September 7, 2009).  
59 Ibid. 
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Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize (ODIN) IED emplacers along the route. Blue 
Forces want to maximize the use of resources to support other priorities across the battle 
space. Blue Forces want to minimize Red Forces’ successful IED attacks and maximize 
observation of IED emplacers. 
Red Forces have multiple IEDs, but due to restricted terrain and other factors, can 
only target one area. Red Forces want to maximize the use of their resources to support 
other priorities across the battle space. Red Forces want to maximize successful IED 
attacks against Blue Forces. 
Figures 12–14 depict the game. The author uses three separate but linked 
scenarios. Scenario one (Figure 12) illustrates Blue Forces observing one of four Named 
Area of Interest (NAI) with a UAV. Red Forces target one of four TAIs with IEDs. 
Scenario two (Figure 13) illustrates Blue Forces observing one of four NAIs with an 
SWT or AWT. Red Forces target one of four TAIs with IEDs. Scenario three (Figure 14) 
illustrates Blue Forces observing one of four NAIs with a M/UM aircraft team (UAV and 
SWT or AWT). Red Forces target one of four TAIs with IEDs. 
It is important to understand the difference between each NAI/TAI and the 
numerical values associated with them. NAI/TAI AC is an open area, which allows for 
good observation by Blue Forces, and in turn, makes it high risk for Red Forces. 
NAI/TAI BC is located in rugged terrain making it more difficult for Blue Forces to 
observe, and thus, allowing Red Forces freedom of movement and adequate cover and 
concealment. NAI/TAI BD is located in an open area, but has high terrain adjacent to it, 
making the route observable by Blue Forces; however, the high terrain makes for 
adequate cover, concealment, and over watch for Red Forces. NAI/TAI AD is located in 
an urban environment; thus, making it difficult for Blue Forces to observe due to 
battlefield clutter, debris along the route, and constant vehicular traffic and pedestrians. 



















UAV observes NAI AC: 8 – open area, good observation
UAV observes NAI BC: 6 – rugged terrain
UAV observes NAI BD: 7 – open area, good observation
UAV observes NAI AD: 3 – difficult of observe – battlefield clutter
Red Options:
Emplace IEDs in TAI AC: 2 – high risk, open area
Emplace IEDs in TAI BC: 7 – rugged terrain with concealment for overwatch
Emplace IEDs in TAI BD: 5 – open area with some concealment 
Emplace IEDs in TAI AD: 9 – low risk, urban environment
 






















SWT/AWT observes NAI AC: 6
SWT/AWT observes NAI BC: 4
SWT/AWT observes NAI BD: 5
SWT/AWT observes NAI AD: 2










Emplace IEDs in TAI AC: 2
Emplace IEDs in TAI BC: 7
Emplace IEDs in TAI BD: 5
Emplace IEDs in TAI AD: 9
 













*Blue helicopter observation times are not continual due to aircraft refuel requirements
Blue Options:
M/UM Team observes NAI AC: 9
M/UM Team observes NAI BC: 7
M/UM Team observes NAI BD: 8










Emplace IEDs in TAI AC: 2
Emplace IEDs in TAI BC: 7
Emplace IEDs in TAI BD: 5
Emplace IEDs in TAI AD: 9
 
Figure 14.   M/UM Aircraft Team (SWT and UAV) versus IED emplacers 
The values associated with each scenario are equal to percentage of success and 
scaled from 1 to 10 or 10 percent to 100 percent success rate. All values are based on 
each area of operation (NAI/TAI) using Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops available, 
Time, and Civilian considerations (METT-TC) as the determining factor for the listed 
numerical value. 
The assumptions used for this game are as follows. 
• Red’s objective is to achieve the highest possible probability of 
successfully attacking Blue while Blue’s objective is to minimize it 
• Red’s gain is Blue’s loss and vice-versa 
• Both sides move simultaneously without communication 
• Both sides know game matrix 
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• The probability of Red’s success does not change for the duration of the 
game 
• Each player’s best strategy is his or her optimal strategy 
• Game occurs over a 24-hour period—day/night 
• Values based on percentage of success using METT-TC 
analysis/considerations 
C. THE ANALYSIS  
For a graphical depiction of the analysis of the game model, please see the 
Appendix. The analysis determines what the optimal strategies are for both blue and red 
forces.  It also includes likely outcomes, security levels, and prudential strategies for both 
forces. 
D.  CONCLUSION 
In all three partial sum game scenarios, Blue Forces should observe NAI BD. 
Blue has no first move, and there is no Nash Equilibrium. Scenario one, Blue’s value of 
the game, is 6.3. Blue should play A 16.67 percent and B 83.33 percent when Red plays 
C 66.67 percent and D 33.33 percent. Scenario two, Blue’s value of the game, is 5.8. 
Blue should play A 20 percent and B 80 percent when Red plays C 60 percent and D 40 
percent. Scenario three, Blue’s value of the game, is 7.4. Blue should play A 20 percent 
and B 80 percent when Red plays C 60 percent and D 40 percent. 
In all three partial sum game scenarios, Red Forces should target TAI BD. Red 
has a first move; however, there is no Nash Equilibrium. Also, in all three scenarios, 
Red’s value of the game is 5.8, and should play C 44.44 percent and D 55.56 percent 
when Blue plays A 22.22 percent and B 77.77 percent. 
The likely outcomes for each scenario are as follows. 
• UAV vs. IED emplacers—7, 5 BD 
• SWT/AWT vs. IED emplacers—5,5 BD 
• M/UM Team vs. IED emplacers—– 8,5 BD 
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In summary, Blue Forces have a much better chance of observing Red Forces 
utilizing the M/UM Aircraft Team (scenario three). Blue should focus reconnaissance 
efforts on NAIs BC and BD (80 percent of the time) and NAIs AC and AD (20 percent of 
the time) for a 74 percent chance of success. Red Forces in all three scenarios should 
target Blue Forces at NAIs AC and BC (44.4 percent of the time) and NAIs AD and BD 
(55.5 percent of the time) for a 58 percent chance of success. 
This type of game model can be utilized in the conduct of RSTA operations to 
assist in the defeat of IED networks, as well as other targets of interest. As discussed in 
previous chapters, constraints, such as rugged and steep terrain, distributed forces, and 
limited resources, can be overcome by teaming M/UM aircraft. Using M/UM aircraft as 
network relay nodes, as well as a maneuver team, increases the commander’s situational 
awareness and kinetic, and non-kinetic effects on the battlefield. This game theory model 
can be used in combat and training to assist in resource distribution and allocation based 
on the enemy situation. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Just as the advent of airpower and the helicopter during the twentieth 
century revolutionized the conduct of modern warfare, the advent of 
unmanned aircraft has significant implications on the conduct of warfare 
for the decades to come.60 
 
Since the beginning of the GWOT, UAS have truly evolved and transformed the 
way the U.S. fights within both the Army and joint forces. The Battle of Sadr City in 
March through April of 2009, and the 25th CAB’s utilization of the TTP during combat in 
Iraq, verify the effectiveness of teaming M/UM aircraft. Whether using the TTP for over 
the horizon voice communication and network relay or conducting RSTA operations, the 
combat lethality and situational awareness provided to the ground commander is 
unquestionable. 
“Unmanned systems seem to offer several ways of reducing the mistakes and 




• Increased Operational Tempos 
• Increase Situational Awareness 
• Lethality 
• Network and Voice Communications Over the Horizon Capability 
• Persistent Reconnaissance & Surveillance 
• Reliable Combat Information  
• Risk Mitigation for the Dull, Dirty, and Dangerous Missions 
• Survivability 
                                                 
60 Carlile and Larese, “Manned-Unmanned Aircraft Teaming Making the Quantum Leap.” 
61 Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-first Century, 397. 
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Some negative factors are associated with M/UM aircraft teaming. The TTP 
provides the ground commander with real time situational awareness that can sometimes 
lead to “misunderstanding from afar.”62 The resultant is sometimes untimely supervision 
from the TOC that dilutes the situational awareness and authority of the leader on the 
battlefield. Additionally, observation of the FMV from the TOC can sometimes be 
deceiving and can cause issues, as the complete ground operation picture is not truly 
depicted. Both of these aforementioned negative factors can be corrected with training, 
experience, and knowledge of the limitations and capabilities of the systems. 
General Petraeus stated, “What we need from Congress: more ISR assets, 
and also full funding of Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Access and Disseminate 
(F3EAD). Inside the DoD, we must also institutionalize elements of this, 
including the ad-hoc arrangements out there currently in use. We must 
capture it all in doctrine, training, institutions, etc. This needs to be taught 
in all our school houses, at the intelligence center, the aviation center, the 
fires center. Maneuver leaders must learn how to exploit these assets.63 
Recommendations for future implementation, and execution of M/UM aircraft 
teaming appear in the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and 
Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) format listed below. 
• Organization: All Army UAS should be placed under the control of the 
CABs to provide direct support to the BCTs in a more efficient and 
effective manner. The task organization of all UAS under the CAB 
provides UAS companies with experienced aviation leadership in 
operations, maintenance, and safety. 
• Doctrine: All doctrine should be updated to include M/UM aircraft 
teaming. This should include Regulations, Joint Publications, Field 
Manuals, Aircrew Training Manuals for both manned and unmanned 
aircraft, and Training Circulars. 
• Training: 
• UAS and manned aircraft crews should conduct virtual reality 
training, which is being developed through the Department of 
Systems Engineering at the United States Military Academy 
(USMA), USARPAC, and USAACE 
                                                 
62 Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-first Century, 351. 
63 Petraues, C-SPAN video briefed at the U.S. Military & Foreign Policy World Affairs Council. 
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• UAS and manned aircraft crews should routinely train together 
using the TTP 
• UAS and manned aircraft crews should conduct live fire exercises 
to verify laser designation and engagement qualifications 
• UAS and manned crews should conduct M/UM aircraft teaming at 
CTCs 
• Staffs should learn through CTCs and home station training to 
incorporate the TTP during planning/Military Decision Making 
Process (MDMP) not just for kinetic and non-kinetic effects but 
also as a combat enabler 
• Material: 
• Continued research in this domain should be aggressively pursued 
• All UAS and manned aircraft should be equipped with the most 
current Mission Equipment Packages (MEP) available  
• Leadership and Education:  
• Commanders at all levels should be briefed on the capabilities, 
limitations and successes and failures of the TTP to include the C2 
complexities 
• All soldiers should understand the capabilities of UAVs  
• Personnel: UAS companies should be manned with intelligence and 
operations personnel, as well as aviation maintenance, and safety 
personnel to enhance daily operations. 
• Facilities: 
• Division airfields should be readied for receipt of the Sky Warrior 
• CTCs and live fire ranges should plan and build the infrastructure 
for UAS operations 
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UAV vs IED Emplacers
 




















































Table 3.   UAV versus IED emplacers, scenario one, partial sum game, Blue Forces 









Table 4.   UAV versus IED emplacers, scenario one, partial sum game, Red Forces 




SWT/AWT vs IED Emplacers
 




Table 6.   SWT/AWT versus IED emplacers, scenario two, partial sum game, 







Table 7.   SWT/AWT versus IED emplacers, scenario two, partial sum game, Blue 









Table 8.   SWT/AWT versus IED emplacers, scenario two, partial sum game, Red 
Forces prudential strategy  
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M/UM Team vs IED Emplacers
 




Table 10.   M/UM Aircraft Team versus IED emplacers, scenario three, partial sum 







Table 11.   M/UM Aircraft Team versus IED emplacers, scenario three, partial sum 










Table 12.   M/UM Aircraft Team versus IED emplacers, scenario three, partial sum 
game, Red Forces prudential strategy  
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